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KINGSLEY BREATHES NEW LIFE INTO
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AS A CHECK ON
ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT POWER
Rosalie Berger Levinson*
“[O]ur Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon
how one chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a “sympathetic” reading, one
which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be
exiled from the province of judging.” 1
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INTRODUCTION
For over twenty-five years I have written law review articles criticizing the
Supreme Court’s emasculation of substantive due process as a check on the
abuse of power by government officials, such as police, jailers, public school
teachers, and social workers. The Court has ratcheted up the standard to
© 2017 Rosalie Berger Levinson. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Senior Research Professor, Valparaiso University Law School.
1 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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hold that only the most egregious official misconduct—that which “shocks
the conscience”—will be considered arbitrary in a constitutional sense. The
Court has made it much more difficult for individuals to challenge executive,
as opposed to legislative, action, despite the fact that substantive due process
was intended, like its forbearer, Magna Carta, to limit the power of the
King—the executive branch. Further, many courts have borrowed the
Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” standard, thereby
treating all victims the same as convicted criminals, who must prove subjective criminal recklessness in order to hold government officials liable for
their wrongdoing. Although the question of what is an “abuse of government
power” is not easily answered, superimposing the Eighth Amendment subjective state-of-mind requirement on those who have never been convicted of a
crime, such as the civilly committed, students, and pretrial detainees, is
totally unwarranted.
In 2015 the Supreme Court, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson,2 for the first time
in decades, issued an opinion that favors victims of abuse of power. It held
that a pretrial detainee alleging excessive force must show only that the force
purposefully used against him was objectively unreasonable in order to demonstrate a due process violation.3 The Court specifically rejected jury instructions mandating that pretrial detainees satisfy the Eighth Amendment
subjective deliberate indifference test, which requires proof that the official
acted with malicious, sadistic intent to harm.4 The opinion has significance
for detainees alleging excessive force, but also for those challenging conditions of confinement, including the denial of prompt, adequate medical care
and the failure to protect from other inmates. Further, Kingsley’s rationale
provides a basis for overturning appellate court cases that have used Eighth
Amendment standards to reject claims brought by others, such as the civilly
committed and students who are mistreated by public officials.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the origin and judicial development of substantive due process, focusing on the lead cases that have led
appellate courts to narrowly construe the substantive due process guarantee.
Part II discusses the Kingsley opinion, both the majority’s analysis and the
dissent’s objection to the use of an objective reasonableness test. Part III
suggests how Kingsley can be used by litigators seeking to protect pretrial
detainees, not only from excessive force, but also from an official’s failure to
protect or failure to care for the medical and other needs of pretrial detainees. Part IV explains how this case can be used to overturn restrictive holdings involving corporal punishment in schools as well as the mistreatment of
the civilly committed.
For many years I have argued that federal substantive due process should
be given its intended meaning as a limitation on arbitrary abuses of executive
power and that victims of such abuse should not be relegated to the vagaries
of the shocks-the-conscience test. Kingsley’s rejection of criminal recklessness
2
3
4

135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2476–77.
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in favor of an objectively unreasonable standard of culpability is a promising
step forward.
I. ORIGINS

AND

DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
IN THE SUPREME COURT

The concept of substantive due process has strong historical roots dating
back to Magna Carta and the Lockean tradition.5 The use of substantive due
process as the source for protecting nontextual rights from state and federal
legislation has a long and contested history, including, most recently, the
Supreme Court’s reliance on substantive due process, coupled with equal
protection, to strike down state bans on same-sex marriage.6
In 1952, the Supreme Court officially recognized substantive due process as a limitation on the power of the executive branch in Rochin v. California.7 The Court invoked substantive due process defensively in a criminal
proceeding to exclude evidence that was obtained by pumping the defendant’s stomach.8 The Court stated that substantive due process is violated by
official conduct that “shocks the conscience” or constitutes force that is “brutal” and “offend[s] even hardened sensibilities.”9 The “shocks the conscience” standard emerged as the test for determining whether misconduct
by executive officials is so aggravated that it violates substantive due
process.10
The Supreme Court decided Rochin before incorporation of the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits states from conducting unreasonable searches
and seizures.11 The Court has subsequently clarified that it will reject any
substantive due process claim that falls under a more explicit constitutional
guarantee, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment.12 However, the Court
5 Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta,
Higher-Law Constitutionalism and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009); see also
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (acknowledging that due
process has its roots in the Magna Carta); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)
(“[T]he Due Process Clause, like its forbear in the Magna Carta, was ‘intended to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884))). Magna Carta’s influence
on the development of constitutional due process rights is described in JOHN V. ORTH, DUE
PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 7 (2003).
6 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589–90 (2015).
7 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
8 Id. at 173.
9 Id. at 172–73.
10 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (“‘[S]ubstantive due process’
prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ . . . .”
(quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172)); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (quoting
Rochin with approval).
11 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that the standards of the
Fourth Amendment, rather than substantive due process, govern a claim of excessive
force); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 326–27 (stating that the Eighth Amendment is “the primary
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has recognized that pretrial detainees, who are no longer protected by the
Fourth Amendment but who have not been convicted so as to trigger the
Eighth Amendment, have a liberty interest in being free from arbitrary treatment, and that substantive due process creates a duty to protect detainees
from guards and other inmates and to provide them with safe conditions of
confinement and necessary medical care.13
In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that those civilly committed to state mental institutions have a “historic liberty interest” in personal
security that is “protected substantively by the Due Process Clause.”14 Further, involuntarily committed patients “are entitled to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish.”15 Although reasoning that the decisions of qualified medical professionals should be deemed presumptively
valid, the Court nonetheless acknowledged that the constitutionally protected liberty interest required the state “to provide minimally adequate or
reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.”16
After balancing the competing concerns, the Court held that substantive due
process is violated if decisions by doctors and nurses constitute “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.”17
In 1998, the Supreme Court revisited and significantly restricted the
meaning of substantive due process as a limitation on executive power in
County of Sacramento v. Lewis.18 The case involved alleged reckless conduct by
a deputy sheriff who conducted a deadly high-speed chase of two boys riding
a motorcycle after they failed to obey an officer’s command to stop.19 Philip
source of substantive [due process] protection” for a prisoner shot in the leg during the
quelling of a riot); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the case should have been dismissed because the substantive due
process question should await a determination of “whether a pretrial detainee can bring a
Fourth Amendment claim based on the use of excessive force by a detention facility
employee”). Citing Graham, Justice Alito asserted that if a Fourth Amendment claim is
available, the Court should not rely on substantive due process. Id.
13 City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (reasoning that where
there has been no “‘formal adjudication of guilt’ . . . the Eighth Amendment has no application” (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 672 n.40 (1977))); accord Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36, 539 (1979); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911,
918–19 (2017) (holding that, where the judicial probable cause determination is based on
evidence fabricated by the police, the Fourth Amendment continues to protect pretrial
detainees despite the formal onset of a criminal proceeding—legal process does not convert a Fourth Amendment claim into one based on the Due Process Clause).
14 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673).
15 Id. at 321–22.
16 Id. at 319.
17 Id. at 323.
18 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
19 Id. at 836–37.
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Lewis, the passenger on the motorcycle, was struck and killed.20 The Court
confirmed that substantive due process may be used to challenge abuses of
government power: “Since the time of our early explanations of due process,
we have understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary
action . . . .”21 The majority cautioned, however, that the “criteria to identify
what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a government officer that is at issue.”22 With regard to the latter,
only “the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the
constitutional sense.’ ”23 The Court explained that executive action raises “a
particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional
claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have called a font of tort
law.”24 Invoking Rochin, the Court imposed a threshold mandate that the
behavior be “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock
the contemporary conscience.”25
In Lewis, the Court refined the Rochin test by addressing the substantive
due process state-of-mind requirement, which is also the subject of Kingsley.26
The Supreme Court has imposed different culpability (state-of-mind)
requirements depending on the type of wrongdoing and the constitutional
guarantee at issue. For example, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim there must be evidence that the force used was “objectively
unreasonable.”27 On the other hand, a convicted inmate bringing an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause must prove that the force was utilized for the purpose of
20 Id. at 837.
21 Id. at 845. The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s substantive due
process claim should be analyzed as a Fourth Amendment seizure because the defendant’s
conduct could not be considered a seizure of Lewis. Id. at 842–44; see also Ciminillo v.
Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,
596–97 (1989)) (explaining that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only when government terminates freedom of movement through means intentionally applied; thus, where
police simply tried to stop a suspect by flashing lights and continued pursuit, no seizure
had occurred).
22 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846.
23 Id. (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
24 Id. at 848 n.8.
25 Id.; see Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time to Bury the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L.
REV. 307, 334–47 (2010) (presenting several arguments for overturning Lewis’ restrictive
“shocks the conscience” standard); see also Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 462
n.2 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (explaining that when a plaintiff complains of abuse of
executive power the “conscience-shocking” test determines liability, rather than the traditional strict scrutiny standard used to measure the constitutionality of legislative acts; thus,
even if a fundamental right is identified and has been impaired, a court must initially
determine whether the government action can be characterized as arbitrary or conscienceshocking in a constitutional sense).
26 See infra Part II.
27 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
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punishing him—“[an] unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”28 applied
“maliciously and sadistically.”29
The commingling of the standard for inmates and pretrial detainees
began in 1973 when the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly,
produced a four-factor test to determine whether the use of force against a
detainee “shocks the conscience.”30 The fourth criterion asked “whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”31 Many
lower courts took this fourth criterion and made “malicious and sadistic
intent” a determinative factor in assessing a substantive due process claim.32
The Supreme Court later adopted this language in explicating the standard
of culpability necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment excessive force viola28 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
29 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
30 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), rejected by Graham, 490 U.S.
386.
31 Id. (citing as other criteria the need for force, the amount of force used, and the
extent of injury inflicted).
32 See Kitchen v. Dallas Cty., 759 F.3d 468, 477–78 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that estate
of pretrial detainee that was claiming detainee was a victim of excessive force must meet
the same standard as a convicted prisoner suing under the Eighth Amendment, and thus,
estate must prove officers used force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm); Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 880–85 (1st Cir. 2010) (asserting
that to establish a substantive due process violation based on executive, as opposed to
legislative, action, the shocks-the-conscience test is limited to “violations of personal rights
. . . so severe . . . so disproportionate to the need presented, and . . . so inspired by malice
or sadism . . . that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally
shocking to the conscience” (first three alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc))); Fennell
v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217–19 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that deputy’s
conduct in kicking pretrial detainee in the face, which resulted in severe fractures and the
necessity for surgery, did not constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the use of force against a detainee is excessive only if it “shocks the
conscience,” and only force that is applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm will
be found to shock the conscience); Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446–48 (4th Cir.
2008) (holding that to succeed on an excessive force claim under the Due Process Clause,
plaintiff must show deputy “inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering,” which
requires looking to the need for application of force, the relationship between the need
and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm (quoting Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 483 (4th
Cir. 1998))), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per
curiam); Cummings v. McIntire, 271 F.3d 341, 345–47 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that police
officer’s unprovoked and angry shove of a person who asked for directions while officer
was busy directing traffic did not shock the conscience and thus did not amount to denial
of substantive due process; although this situation did not involve a high-speed law enforcement chase, nor did it involve a situation where decisionmaking was unhurried, the record
did not permit a finding that officer acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm).
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tion.33 However, unlike substantive due process, both the text of the Eighth
Amendment—“cruel and unusual punishment”—and the understanding
that a conviction diminishes one’s rights provide greater justification for this
draconian standard.34
In Lewis, the Court confronted the question of what level of culpability is
necessary to satisfy Rochin’s “shock-the-conscience” standard with regard to
those not yet convicted of a crime. It reasoned that government officials who
act with “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights “shock the conscience”—for example, prison guards who are deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of pretrial detainees.35 However, the Lewis Court explained
that because deliberate indifference implies the opportunity for actual deliberation, this standard could not reasonably apply to police officers who face a
situation calling for fast action.36 Thus, the Court held that injuries stemming from a “high-speed chase[ ] with no intent to harm suspects physically
or to worsen their legal plight [did] not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment.”37

33 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; cf. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct.
2466, 2475–76 (2015) (clarifying that the “malicious and sadistic” language was not
intended as “a necessary condition for liability” under substantive due process).
34 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (holding that when the state punishes convicted prisoners, it does not violate liberty interests protected by the Due Process
Clause); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (adopting subjective deliberate indifference as the Eighth Amendment standard for judging conditions of confinement because
“[i]f the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment . . . some mental element
must be attributed to the inflicting officer” to qualify as cruel and unusual (emphasis
omitted)).
35 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998). The Court also cited
Youngberg v. Romeo as establishing a substantive due process violation where medical personnel at a state mental institution failed to provide minimally adequate training and habilitation to those who were involuntarily committed. Id. at 852 n.12 (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319–25 (1982)).
36 Id. at 854.
37 Id.; see also Steele v. Cicci, 855 F.3d 494, 502–03 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that
under Lewis, pretrial detainees challenging executive, as opposed to legislative, action must
show the deprivation shocks the conscience, and this demands a “degree of wrongfulness”
that ranges from deliberate indifference to actual intent to cause harm depending upon
the circumstances (quoting Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 973 (3d Cir.
2015))); Vargas, 783 F.3d at 973–74 (recognizing that the degree of wrongfulness necessary
to satisfy the “conscience shocking” level depends on the circumstances, and that actual
intent must be proved where officers face a “hyperpressurized environment” requiring
snap judgment (quoting Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam))); Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2008) (joining the
Eighth Circuit in adopting a categorical rule that the intent-to-harm standard, rather than
the deliberate indifference standard, applies to all high-speed police pursuits aimed at
apprehending suspected offenders because it is too difficult for courts to determine in
hindsight whether a high-speed chase involved an emergency or nonemergency situation).
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The Court cited with approval the Eighth Amendment standard used to
impose liability for harm caused in a prison riot case.38 Because the
deceased’s family members in Lewis did not allege that the deputies acted
with “intent to harm” when they struck and killed their son, they failed to
meet the shocks-the-conscience test.39 On the other hand, the Court clarified that a “deliberate indifference” test should govern claims alleging abuse
of executive power in a nonemergency situation.40 However, it did not specify whether objective or subjective deliberate indifference should be the standard,41 and this created the circuit split addressed in Kingsley.42
Outside the law enforcement context, the “state-of-mind” requirement
for substantive due process claims has been equally contentious. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that corporal punishment or other
disciplinary action taken by public school teachers may violate substantive
due process. While rejecting procedural due process claims, the Court in
Ingraham v. Wright43 recognized that imposition of corporal punishment by
public school officials deprives students of liberty.44 However, several appellate courts have required students to meet a draconian criminal recklessness
standard in order to successfully sue their teachers for violating substantive
due process.45 Similarly, appellate courts have ratcheted up the standard for
38 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851–54 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318–22 (1986), for
the principle that convicts, in the context of a prison riot, must show that a use of force
constituted an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at
320)).
39 Id. at 855.
40 Lower courts have generally applied a deliberate indifference test in nonemergency
situations. See, e.g., Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 431–32
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that because officers had ample time for reflection to decide what
course of action to take in response to domestic violence, deliberate indifference was the
requisite state of mind for showing that defendants’ conduct shocked the conscience).
However, some appellate courts have held that even where there is time to deliberate, the
“intent to harm” standard should be used whenever government officials must balance
competing legitimate concerns. See Levinson, supra note 25, at 325–27 (critiquing these
cases).
41 Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining that the Supreme
Court’s deliberate indifference standard “can be defined subjectively (what a person actually knew, and disregarded), or objectively (what a reasonable person knew, or should have
known)”); Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating that “the
Supreme Court has never specified whether ‘deliberate indifference’ is subjective or objective in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a municipal prison official,”
and explaining that liability attaches under the Eighth Amendment only if the official actually knows of and disregards an excessive risk of harm, whereas an objective standard permits liability to be premised on “obviousness or constructive notice” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994))).
42 See infra Part II.
43 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
44 Id. at 672.
45 See infra Part IV.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL108.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 9

9-NOV-17

breathing new life into substantive due process

13:47

365

proving substantive due process violations against those who are civilly
committed.46
Thus, although the Supreme Court has recognized substantive due process as a constitutional check on executive power, the open-ended shocksthe-conscience standard, as explicated in Lewis, led many appellate courts to
impose an extremely high state-of-mind threshold on those who challenge
misuse of government power. Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court held that
a deprivation of liberty must involve more than negligent conduct.47 Lewis
clarified that, except in emergency situations, deliberate indifference is the
standard for assessing culpability. However, the shocks-the-conscience language it invoked—conduct “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience”48—was interpreted by many
courts to require detainees to meet the Eighth Amendment’s subjective,
rather than an objective, deliberate indifference standard.49 Whereas “subjective” deliberate indifference requires proof that the defendant acted with
actual knowledge of constitutional risks, “objective” deliberate indifference
recognizes a knew or should have known (“constructive notice”) standard.50
II. KINGSLEY RESOLVES CIRCUIT CONFLICT IN FAVOR
REASONABLENESS TEST

OF AN

OBJECTIVE

Michael Kingsley was a pretrial detainee who claimed he was subjected to
excessive force after he refused to remove a piece of paper covering a light
above his bed.51 Although there were conflicting accounts as to whether
Kingsley continued to resist the officers after he was handcuffed and moved
to a receiving cell, it was uncontested that officers applied a Taser to Kingsley’s back for approximately five seconds.52 He was then left handcuffed in
the receiving cell for fifteen minutes, after which the officers returned and
removed the handcuffs.53
46 See infra Part IV.
47 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–36 (1986) (holding that a violation of due
process requires more than negligence; however, the Court did not decide whether intent
or deliberate indifference or recklessness should be the standard).
48 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998).
49 See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 450–51 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Seventh
Circuit precedent using Eighth Amendment standards), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); id. at
457 n.1 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (noting that whereas the Ninth Circuit applied an objective Fourth Amendment standard to excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees,
the Third and Eleventh Circuits applied the Eighth Amendment standard).
50 Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise, or
Discipline Subordinates in a Post-Iqbal/Connick World, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 283–85
(2012) (explaining the importance of the difference between subjective and objective
deliberate indifference when victims of abuse of power seek to hold government officials
accountable for their wrongdoing).
51 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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After Kingsley filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
excessive use of force, the four jail officers moved for summary judgment.54
The district court followed Seventh Circuit precedent, which applied Eighth
Amendment standards to pretrial detainees, requiring them to prove that
defendants acted with malicious and sadistic intent for the purpose of causing them harm.55 The trial court denied summary judgment, but in its jury
instructions it asserted that (1) “[e]xcessive force means force applied recklessly that is unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of the time,”
and that (2) the plaintiff must prove that the “[d]efendants knew that using
force presented a risk of harm to plaintiff, but they recklessly disregarded
plaintiff’s safety.”56
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Kingsley asserted that these instructions wrongfully conflated the standard for excessive force claims under the
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause by requiring him to show
that the defendants acted with reckless disregard for his rights.57 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and held instead that a pretrial detainee,
like a convicted inmate, must show “an actual intent to violate [the plaintiff’s] rights or reckless disregard for his rights,” and thus a subjective inquiry
into the officer’s state of mind is necessary.58
In dissent, Judge Hamilton opined that the appropriate standard for
excessive use of force against a pretrial detainee should be an objective reasonableness test, similar to the Fourth Amendment.59 He expressed his concern that pretrial detainees who cannot post bail may remain in jail for weeks
or months, and, citing earlier Seventh Circuit precedent, he asserted that
“[t]he transition from arrest to pretrial detention does not give officers
‘greater ability to assault and batter’ the detainees.”60
In a five–four decision, the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Hamilton
that the relevant culpability standard is objective, not subjective, deliberate
indifference. Thus, the jury instruction suggesting that Kingsley had to prove
the defendant’s subjective state of mind (recklessness) in using excessive
force was error.61 Justice Breyer, in his majority opinion, explained that the
lower courts had conflated two separate state-of-mind questions. “The first
concerns the defendant’s state of mind with respect to his physical acts,” and
here there was no dispute that the officers deliberately intended to restrain
and tase Kingsley.62 The second question addressed “the defendant’s state of
54 Id. at 2471.
55 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2466
(2015).
56 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2471 (second emphasis added).
57 Kingsley, 744 F.3d at 448.
58 Id. at 451 (alteration in original) (quoting Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th
Cir. 1996)).
59 Id. at 460–62 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 460 (quoting Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990)).
61 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472.
62 Id. The Court did not rule out the possibility that reckless, as opposed to purposeful actions, were also actionable. Id.
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mind with respect to whether his use of force was ‘excessive,’ ” and, as to this
question, the Court resolved the circuit split by adopting an objective reasonableness standard for substantive due process excessive force claims.63 If the
officers intentionally, rather than accidentally or negligently, used a certain
level of force, their subjective state of mind when doing so was irrelevant, and
the only question was whether their actions were reasonable under the circumstances.64 Detainees need not demonstrate that officials subjectively
intended to punish them or to “maliciously and sadistically” injure them.65
The Court explained that the Due Process Clause, unlike the Eighth
Amendment that applies to convicted criminals, protects pretrial detainees
from the use of “force that amounts to punishment.”66 Further, even absent
an express intent to punish, a pretrial detainee may prevail by producing
“objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”67
In justifying its rejection of subjective deliberate indifference, the Court
asserted that an objective standard comported with the training already provided to officers who interact with detainees.68 In addition, it sufficiently
protected officers who act in good faith because “a court must judge the
reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer.”69 The use of force will be actionable only
where it was “an intentional and knowing act,” and officers will enjoy qualified immunity unless the use of excessive force violated a clearly established
right.70 Further, the Court noted that the objective standard was already part
of pattern jury instructions in several circuits,71 and in those circuits there
was no evidence of frivolous filings by pretrial detainees.72
63 Id. at 2472–73.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2475–76 (explaining how this language, which stemmed from the Second
Circuit’s decision in Johnson v. Glick, was never intended to be “a necessary condition for
liability”). Compare Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (holding that subjective
intent to cause malicious and sadistic harm is required to prove a violation of the Eighth
Amendment), with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (holding that an officer’s
“underlying intent and motivation” is not a determinative factor in deciding whether the
officer violated the Fourth Amendment).
66 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10).
67 Id. at 2473–74.
68 Id. at 2474.
69 Id.
70 Id. For a discussion of qualified immunity in the context of substantive due process
claims brought by pretrial detainees, see IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, 2 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 2:13 (2017).
71 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2474; see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 744 F.3d 443, 458 (7th
Cir. 2014) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Committee on Pattern Civil Jury
Instructions of the Seventh Circuit approved use of this objective reasonableness standard
for excessive force claims by pretrial detainees as well as arrestees in 2009).
72 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2476.
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The Court ultimately determined that the jurors were erroneously
instructed that Kingsley had to show that the officers “recklessly disregarded”
his safety, because this imposed an additional requirement beyond the need
to show that the purposeful use of force was unreasonable in light of the facts
and circumstances at the time.73 Because the jury was told to “weigh
[defendants’] subjective reasons for using force and subjective views about
the excessiveness of the force,” the case was remanded to the court of appeals
to determine whether that error was harmless.74
The significance of this ruling is reflected in the remand. During the
oral argument, Justice Alito suggested that because subjective intent may be
inferred from objective factors it really made no difference whether a purely
objective or subjective standard was used.75 The Seventh Circuit thought
otherwise. It held that the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless
because the jury may have concluded that, although the officers acted in an
objectively unreasonable manner, they lacked the subjective intent required
by the erroneous instruction.76 The court further found that a reasonable
officer should have been on notice that slamming a nonresistant detainee
against a wall and using a stun-gun while he was handcuffed violated the
clearly established substantive due process right to be free from excessive
force.77
The Supreme Court in Kingsley admonished that the only relevant factors for assessing excessive force under substantive due process are the same
objective ones that govern the Fourth Amendment, namely
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of
force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer
to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.78

As the Seventh Circuit acknowledged on remand, adding the subjective
intent requirement to prove excessive force “increased, significantly, [Kingsley’s] burden of proof.”79
It is noteworthy that the majority did not mention the rigorous shocksthe-conscience standard in adjudicating the substantive due process claim.
Nor did it discuss the need to identify a “fundamental right” or the difference between acts and failure to act—all theories relied upon by appellate
73 Id. at 2476–77.
74 Id. at 2477.
75 Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015)
(No. 14-6368); see also infra notes 160–163 and accompanying text.
76 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
77 Id. at 832.
78 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473. These factors allow courts to weigh security concerns as
well as the specific circumstances that the officer faced.
79 Kingsley, 801 F.3d at 831.
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courts to restrict substantive due process claims.80 Instead, the majority
based its analysis on the 1979 decision in Bell v. Wolfish where the Supreme
Court adopted an objective standard to evaluate the detainees’ substantive
due process challenge to prison conditions, including a prison’s practice of
double-bunking.81 The Bell Court did not examine the prison officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy, but rather, looked only to objective evidence
to assess whether the conditions were reasonably related to the legitimate
purpose of holding detainees for trial and whether they were excessive in
relation to that purpose.82
As to Lewis’s holding that a “purpose to cause harm” is needed in the
context of a prison-riot situation or a high-speed chase, the Court explained
that the Lewis opinion was referring to “the defendant’s intent to commit the
acts in question, not to whether the force intentionally used was ‘excessive.’ ”83 Thus, the Lewis Court was addressing what Kingsley characterized as
the “first” state-of-mind question.84 For either the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment there must be some intentional or possibly reckless conduct to
establish a constitutional violation. Lewis simply recognized that “liability for
negligently inflicted harm is [below] the threshold of constitutional due
process.”85
Thus, even in cases calling for quick action, if that action is intentional,
the Eighth Amendment state-of-mind test should not govern detainees’
claims of excessive force. This explication is critical. Many appellate courts
have required detainees to prove that officials acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” whenever they are responding to
emergency or rapidly evolving situations.86 The Fourth Amendment’s objec80 Levinson, supra note 25, at 320–22 (critiquing appellate court decisions that have
imposed this requirement); see also infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Scalia’s reliance on the absence of a fundamental right to reject Kingsley’s substantive due process claim).
81 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541–43 (1979).
82 Id. at 539–43.
83 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2475 (emphasis omitted) (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 854 n.13 (1998)).
84 Id. at 2472; see supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
85 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)); see also
Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989) (holding that “seizure” requires “intentional acquisition of physical control” through “means intentionally applied” (emphasis
omitted)).
86 See, e.g., Shreve v. Franklin Cty., 743 F.3d 126, 133–38 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 2001)) (recognizing that pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claim is governed by the Due Process Clause, but finding that the
shocks-the-conscience test, when applied to officials responding to a rapidly evolving, dangerous situation, is the same as the Eighth Amendment test; thus, plaintiff must show that
defendant acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm); Fuentes
v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 343–48 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that placement of convicted, but
unsentenced, county prison inmate in restraint chair for eight hours following disturbance
did not violate substantive due process, even if prison officials overreacted in using this
chair, where there was no evidence that conduct was maliciously or sadistically taken to
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tive reasonableness standard already takes this temporal factor into account.
In Graham v. Connor, the Court explained that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain,
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”87 Assuming, however, that the conduct is deliberate, detainees should no longer have to prove a mens rea of criminal recklessness in
order to prevail. Instead, as several appellate courts have now recognized,
culpability for the deliberate use of excessive force must be assessed from the
perspective of a reasonable officer, including one who must make a splitsecond decision.88
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, argued in
dissent that the Bell opinion focused on “intent to punish,” which necessarily
implies subjective intent.89 Further, he explained that the substantive due
process claim in Bell arose in the context of a conditions-of-confinement case
where jail security policies resulted from “considered deliberation by the
authority imposing the detention,” thus making it logical to infer “punitive
intent.”90 Ultimately, Justice Scalia opined that there was no substantive due
cause harm because prison officials had to quickly respond in order to quell a disturbance
and to minimize the possibility of an escalating disruption inside the prison).
87 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
88 See Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016) (remanding district court
decision because it imposed the malicious, sadistic, culpable state-of-mind standard instead
of Kingsley’s objective reasonableness standard); Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Dávila, 813 F.3d
64, 70 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding that after Kingsley “a pre-trial detainee need not necessarily
prove the officer’s intent to harm or punish,” but only that the force used failed the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment); Coley v. Lucas Cty., 799 F.3d 530,
537–39 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying Kingsley to hold that excessive force claims brought by
pretrial detainees require plaintiff to show that the force purposefully or knowingly used
against him was objectively unreasonable, taking into account such factors as the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount used, the extent of injury
inflicted, officer’s efforts to temper or limit the amount of force, the severity of the security
problems, the threat reasonably perceived, and whether the detainee was actively resisting;
under this standard, police officer’s shoving of fully restrained pretrial detainee, causing
him to strike his head on the cement floor and die from the injuries, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of detainee’s rights where detainee was handcuffed, in a belly chain
and leg irons, and fully incapable of causing any disruption); Ondo v. City of Cleveland,
795 F.3d 597, 610 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that Kingsley confirmed that an objective standard, which is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer, including one who
must make split-second judgments, must now govern substantive due process claims alleging excessive force); cf. Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 427–28 (8th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that excessive force claims of pretrial detainees are analyzed under the objective
reasonableness standard set forth in Kingsley, but finding that defendant’s actions in
extracting pretrial detainee from his jail cell by placing body weight on him while he was
on the ground in a prone position and then twice deploying a taser in stun mode during
the extraction could not be viewed as objectively unreasonable where detainee, as viewed
in the video, was actively resisting the extraction procedure).
89 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90 Id.
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process liberty interest in being free from objectively unreasonable force
because “Kingsley’s interest is not one of the ‘fundamental liberty interests’
that substantive due process protects.”91 Notably, many appellate courts have
required victims of executive misconduct to initially identify a fundamental
liberty interest,92 despite the fact that Justice Scalia made the very same argument without garnering any support eighteen years earlier in his concurring
opinion in Lewis.93 Asserting traditional federalism concerns, he chastised
the majority for abandoning this strict approach and for its “tender-hearted
desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment.”94
III. KINGSLEY’S IMPACT ON FUTURE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LITIGATION
INVOLVING PRETRIAL DETAINEES
The Supreme Court’s rejection in Kingsley of a subjective state-of-mind
requirement is significant. As discussed in Part II, prior to this case most
91 Id. at 2479.
92 See, e.g., Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 408 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that district
court erred in ruling that substantive due process protects against action that shocks the
conscience or action that interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty;
rather, Lewis mandated that civilly committed sex offenders demonstrate both that their
treatment was conscience-shocking and that it violated a fundamental liberty interest); Folkerts v. City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 980–81 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[t]o establish a
substantive due process violation, the [plaintiffs] must demonstrate that a fundamental
right was violated and that [the officer]’s conduct shocks the conscience”; but here, even if
officer’s behavior during interrogation and investigation of intellectually disabled suspect
violated his fundamental rights, officer’s behavior did not shock the conscience); Christensen v. Cty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 461–65 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (rejecting substantive due process claim brought by couple who complained they were stalked and trailed by
an officer in his squad car as a result of a personal vendetta, because the couple could not
identify a fundamental right that was directly and substantially impaired by the officer’s
conduct); Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869, 871–74 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding no
actionable claim against a police lieutenant who directed his officers to conduct a monthlong patrol of a private residence because he did not like the occupants moving into his
neighborhood; absent a showing both that the conduct violated a fundamental right and
shocked the conscience, no substantive due process violation could be asserted).
93 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 860–61 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 541–55 (2008) (presenting arguments as to why substantive due
process challenges to executive action should reach beyond the protection of “fundamental” rights to include all arbitrary deprivations of liberty and property); Levinson, supra
note 25, at 320–22 (critiquing the Justices’ conflicting opinions in Lewis as to whether the
shocks-the-conscience test replaces the fundamental rights analysis that applies when legislative, as opposed to executive, action is challenged).
94 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2479 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Levinson, supra note 93, at
556–59 (challenging Justice Scalia’s concerns about federalism and “tortifying” the Fourteenth Amendment). In a separate dissent, Justice Alito asserted that the Court should
have first determined whether a pretrial detainee can bring a Fourth Amendment claim
based on the use of excessive force by a detention facility employee before addressing the
controversial substantive due process claim. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2479 (Alito, J., dissenting); see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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appellate courts conceded that substantive due process, not the Eighth
Amendment, governed claims brought by pretrial detainees. Nonetheless,
while often invoking shocks-the-conscience language, they imposed the
Eighth Amendment subjective intent standard, which requires detainees to
prove that the officials used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.”95 Kingsley clarified that an objective reasonableness standard, not subjective criminal recklessness, will now govern detainee
claims of excessive force.96 Further, the Court did not invoke the highly
charged shocks-the-conscience language of Rochin and its progeny.
On the other hand, the Kingsley majority emphasized that the official’s
conduct—namely, the physical acts of restraining and tasing Kingsley—was
deliberate/intentional.97 In contrast, many detainees challenge a failure to
act (i.e., a failure to provide safe conditions of confinement, including necessary medical care and protection from other inmates). In cases involving
“inaction,” finding the requisite culpability level is a bit more complicated.
This Part explores what impact Kingsley should have on litigating these types
of claims brought by pretrial detainees.
A. Conditions of Confinement
As noted in Part II, the Supreme Court has applied different culpability
standards depending on the specific constitutional provision at issue and the
factual context (i.e., whether the wrongdoer had time to deliberate). With
regard to a conditions-of-confinement claim, the Supreme Court in Bell held
that a pretrial detainee is entitled to be free from conditions that amount to
punishment.98 In contrast, a convicted prisoner is entitled to be free only
from conditions that constitute “cruel and unusual punishment.”99 In both
cases the “conditions must be objectively serious enough to amount to a constitutional deprivation, and the defendant prison official must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”100
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court explicated the culpability standard necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment violation. It explained that:
95 See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), rejected by Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989); supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
96 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74; see also supra note 88 for decisions acknowledging
this change.
97 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472; see also Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 799–802 (7th Cir.
2015) (holding that civil detainee alleging guards used excessive force in refusing to
remove his handcuffs, causing him to urinate on himself, must prove defendants took their
action with an expressed intent to punish or that the actions were not rationally related to a
legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose or that the actions appeared excessive in
relation to that purpose; however, Kingsley confirmed that plaintiff must initially establish
that defendants possessed a purposeful, knowing, or possibly reckless state of mind with
respect to their actions toward the plaintiff).
98 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[T]he proper inquiry is whether those
conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” (footnote omitted)).
99 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
100 Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015) (footnote omitted).
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[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.101

The Court conceded that this subjective recklessness standard allows an official to avoid liability when he fails “to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not.”102 But, it specifically rejected an “invitation to
adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference.”103
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition in Bell that the Due Process
Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, governs challenges to conditions of confinement brought by pretrial detainees,104 prior to Kingsley many appellate
courts simply borrowed the Eighth Amendment standard of culpability,
thereby requiring detainees to meet a subjective criminal recklessness standard.105 Some relied on Bell’s assertion that detainees have a substantive due
101 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
102 Id. at 838 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 837.
104 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Due process requires that a pretrial
detainee not be punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be
punished . . . .”).
105 See, e.g., Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842–43 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that pretrial detainee’s challenge to jail conditions are examined under the Eighth
Amendment, which requires that the conditions demonstrate deliberate indifference to
the denial of a minimally civilized measure of life’s necessities; however, evidence of poor
sanitation and hygiene along with lack of heat and bedding, overcrowding, and inadequate
recreation cumulatively may be sufficient to state a claim for relief, especially where three
doctors told the plaintiff that unsanitary conditions caused his leg infection and he testified that the jail conditions traumatized him); Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709
F.3d 563, 568–79 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that pretrial detainee’s claim that she was shackled during labor should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment; thus, she was required
to prove that the official was aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of
harm could be drawn and that the official drew that inference); Davis v. Oregon Cty., 607
F.3d 543, 548–52 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that pretrial detainees’ claims regarding conditions of confinement are analyzed in the same way as those under the Eighth Amendment;
thus, detainees must show that defendants acted with subjective deliberate indifference in
failing to ensure plaintiffs’ safety after a fire broke out at the county jail); Ledbetter v. City
of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
provides the benchmark for due process claims brought by pretrial detainees, and thus
plaintiff must prove officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health and
safety and that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious”). Compare Pierce v. Cty. of Orange,
526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment “right
against jail conditions or restrictions that ‘amount to punishment’” is a “standard [that]
differs significantly from the standard relevant to convicted prisoners” (quoting Bell, 441
U.S. at 535–37)), with Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 163–66 (3d Cir. 2005) (asserting
that in resolving pretrial detainees’ challenge to conditions of confinement, which
involved celling three detainees in a cell designed to be occupied by a single person, the
district court should have employed due process analysis to determine whether conditions
of confinement amounted to punishment, rather than the Eighth Amendment standard,
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process right to not be subjected to “punishment”106 to infer that subjective
intent to punish must be established.107 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument in Kingsley, specifically holding that a pretrial detainee need not
prove intent to punish; rather, as Bell instructed, a pretrial detainee may prevail by showing that the defendant’s purposeful actions were not “rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose.”108 Notably, however, Kingsley rejected the use of this Eighth Amendment standard in the
context of an excessive force claim where the victim can more readily point
to an intentional physical act.
Where a detainee alleges deliberate, as opposed to unintended, constitutional violations with regard to conditions of confinement, Kingsley strongly
suggests that superimposing Eighth Amendment standards, as opposed to an
objective deliberate indifference test, is unwarranted. In fact, the dissenting
Justices in Kingsley distinguished Bell as a case where a subjective intent standard was less appropriate because jail officials have time to deliberate and to
address grave, pervasive conditions of confinement.109 Also, the Court in
Bell explained that “if a restriction or condition [of pretrial detention] is not
reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a
court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is
punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees.”110
Some courts, even before Kingsley, allowed detainees to prevail either by showing express intent to punish or by inferring such intent where the conditions
which mandates only that punishment not be cruel and unusual; whereas Eighth Amendment is designed to protect those convicted of crimes, pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all under the Due Process Clause).
106 Bell, 441 U.S. at 541–43.
107 Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1067–69 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that although
a pretrial detainee cannot be subject to any punishment, whether cruel-and-unusual or
not, evidence must show that the defendant’s purpose in using force was to injure, punish,
or discipline detainee); Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 2006) (reasoning
that despite Bell’s holding that due process restricts punishing a detainee prior to the adjudication of guilt, the substantive due process inquiry is whether detainee has been improperly punished and infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter,
and thus, deliberate indifference, rather than a lesser “reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective” standard should apply); Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892–93
(7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that although pretrial detainees have greater rights than convicted inmates, when the issue is whether brutal treatment should be “assimilated to punishment,” the standard is the same); Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029–32 (9th Cir.
2004) (invoking the Supreme Court’s ruling that a detainee may not be punished prior to
an adjudication of guilt and finding that a substantive due process violation occurs only
where government action caused the detainee to suffer some harm or disability and the
purpose of this action was to punish the detainee); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.
Ct. 2466, 2478 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell, 441
U.S. at 561).
109 Id. at 2478 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
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were not reasonably related to a legitimate government objective or were
excessive in relation to that objective.111
Similarly, the majority in Kingsley emphasized that detainees need not
prove that a deliberate physical act was taken with the intent to punish. It
explained that the Bell Court applied an “objective standard” to a variety of
jail conditions without “consider[ing] the prison officials’ subjective beliefs
about [the conditions].”112 In the context of a conditions case, it should
suffice that officials intentionally (or possibly recklessly) subjected detainees,
through action or inaction, to conditions which fail Bell’s objective “reasonable relation” test.113 Indeed, combining the Kingsley majority opinion and
dissent,114 eight Justices endorsed the view expressed in Bell that an objective
“reasonable relation” test should govern “conditions” claims brought by pretrial detainees.
The Fifth Circuit, even before Kingsley, recognized that where a detainee
is challenging an established condition of confinement—a “systemic” violation—Bell’s “reasonably related to a nonpunitive purpose” standard should
govern.115 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit required detainees to satisfy
111 Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1240–43 (10th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that Bell
requires courts to determine whether there was an express intent to punish or, if not,
whether plaintiff can nonetheless show that the restriction in question bears no reasonable
relationship to any legitimate governmental objective, and holding that district court erred
in applying Eighth Amendment “malicious and sadistic” test with regard to juvenile pretrial
detainee who spent many hours shackled to a Pro-Straint chair, which used wrist, waist,
chest, and ankle restraints to arguably punish the eleven-year-old); Duvall v. Dallas Cty.,
631 F.3d 203, 206–09 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that to succeed on a conditions of confinement claim, pretrial detainee need only show that the condition, “has no
reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental interest” and “intent to [subject a
detainee to inhumane conditions of confinement or abusive jail practices] is nevertheless
presumed when [the county] incarcerates the detainee in the face of such known conditions and practices” (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 644 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc))); Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (in determining whether strip search of pretrial detainee violates substantive due
process, Bell explains that the critical inquiry is “whether particular restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment in the constitutional sense
of that word,” and punitive intent may be inferred if a restriction is not reasonably related
to a legitimate goal (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538)); Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62,
67–68 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that district court erred in dismissing pretrial detainees’
claim that their placement in restrictive confinement violated their substantive due process
rights, because, although plaintiffs must allege that the deprivation was objectively sufficiently serious and that the officials subjectively acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind, a measure will be deemed unconstitutional punishment in violation of pretrial
detainees’ substantive due process rights if there is a showing of an express intent to punish, or the restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive
government purpose, or the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose).
112 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74.
113 Id. at 2472 (leaving open the possibility of imposing liability for “reckless” conduct).
114 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
115 Estate of Henson v. Wichita Cty., 795 F.3d 456, 463–69 (5th Cir. 2015); see also
Montano v. Orange Cty., 842 F.3d 865, 875 (5th Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that, even in
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Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference test where they made an “episodicacts-or-omissions” claim against some specifically named jail officials.116
Thus, the Fifth Circuit maintained that the critical question is whether the
defendants’ acts or omissions were sufficiently extended or pervasive to prove
an intended condition or practice.
After Kingsley, pretrial detainees alleging that the challenged “conditions” reflect a policy or practice have satisfied what Justice Breyer described
as the first state-of-mind requirement—that the action was deliberate and not
merely negligent.117 At that point, as the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged,
pretrial detainees can prevail “by providing only objective evidence that the
challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”118
The most difficult questions arise with so-called “episodic” violations,
where the harm does not occur pursuant to an established practice or policy,
and where, in fact, the official’s action may be contrary to policy. Kingsley
recognized that detainees must prove “the defendant ‘possess[ed] a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind’ with respect to [his]
actions (or inaction).”119 However, once this is established, Kingsley held
that an intended act violates substantive due process “even if the act was not
the absence of a formal policy, evidence of a pattern of acts or omissions or pervasive
misconduct by jail officials may prove that the conditions were intended, and here the
consistent testimony of jail employees established a de facto policy); Smith v. Dart, 803
F.3d 304, 309 n.2 (7th Cir. 2015) (asserting that where a detainee alleges “potentially systemic” constitutional violations, the subjective state-of-mind element is “not at issue”).
116 Henson, 795 F.3d at 464.
117 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
118 Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850 F.3d 849, 856–58 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2373–74) (invoking Kingsley, the court found that the jail’s underwear policy, which deprived female inmates of their underwear if it was not white, was not
rationally related to a legitimate government objective, and, even if it were, the policy was
excessive in relation to that purpose, unnecessarily depriving women of their dignity interest); see also Ingram v. Cole Cty., 846 F.3d 282, 286–88 (8th Cir. 2017) (invoking Kingsley to
reject subjective deliberate indifference standard that applied to convicted inmates and
finding that county’s laundry policy, which deprived pretrial detainees of all clothing for
approximately seven hours every four nights for women and every two to three nights for
men, during which time guards and cellmates could see them naked, was not “reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective”; although a “minimal deprivation” does not
violate the Constitution, here the frequency with which cellmates were exposed constituted
more than a de minimis deprivation, and the government failed to explain why the jail
could not provide enough clothes to avoid extended periods without clothing), vacated and
reh’g en banc granted (8th Cir. Apr. 17, 2017).
119 Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2015) (first alteration in original) (quoting Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472); cf. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 n.2, 310 (7th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing that the subjective intent aspect of Kingsley may be inferred where a detainee
alleges “potentially systemic” violations, such as pest infestation, contaminated water, and
inadequate food, but then asserting that Eighth Amendment standards still govern other
conditions of confinement claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
protection afforded detainees and convicted inmates is “functionally indistinguishable”).
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intended as punishment.”120 Kingsley flatly rejected the imposition of
Farmer’s subjective criminal recklessness test whenever a detainee’s rights are
violated by deliberate decisions regarding conditions of confinement, even if
a policy or practice cannot be established.121 Further, failure to meet the
nebulous shocks-the-conscience standard should no longer provide a rationale for subjecting detainees to conditions that are not reasonably related to
legitimate government objectives.122
B. Failure to Protect from Others
The action/inaction dichotomy used to exonerate jail officials in “conditions” cases has also been invoked to reject other substantive due process
claims, even where the failure to act manifests deliberate indifference to the
rights of detainees. This principle is particularly problematic in cases where
the detainee is harmed by others who are incarcerated. The argument is that
where government officials’ “inaction,” as opposed to their “affirmative” acts,
causes harm, a heightened culpability standard is required.123 However, the
core of substantive due process is its protection against “abuse of power,”
which should encompass a government official’s deliberate failure to act that
120 Davis, 792 F.3d at 801 (quoting Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 2005)).
121 Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473; see also Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2017)
(applying objective test but finding that pretrial detainee’s placement in administrative
segregation did not violate his substantive due process rights because the decision was
reasonably related to internal security reasons, and, even if segregation was not the least
restrictive means available to accomplish its nonpunitive objective, this does not mean the
transfer was an excessive response to a legitimate security concern); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849
F.3d 17, 32–38 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that Kingsley overturned precedent that required
pretrial detainee to meet the same Eighth Amendment standards as convicted prisoners
with regard to a challenge to conditions of confinement; because deliberate indifference is
defined objectively, it sufficed that pretrial detainee proved defendant official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to
mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
health or safety”; pretrial detainees are no longer required to establish subjective intent to
punish or to expose detainees to a substantial risk of harm, and thus official need not have
subjective awareness that his acts or omissions pose a substantial risk of harm).
122 Cf. Steele, 855 F.3d at 502–03 (holding that pretrial detainee who claimed his substantive due process rights were violated by officials’ failure to provide him unlimited, nonlegal phone privileges during his administrative segregation could not show that this
“shocked the conscience,” as required to support claim, even though detainee argued that
this prevented him from finding a cosignor for his bail and exercising his bail option);
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 483–84 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that confiscation of a detainee’s prosthetic leg was not arbitrary or conscience-shocking
in a constitutional sense).
123 See, e.g., Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2478 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that unlike failureto-protect claims, which always relate to a government actor’s omissions, conditions-of-confinement claims might be properly characterized as affirmative governmental acts).
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can be causally linked to the constitutional deprivation.124 The Supreme
Court clarified that government officials have a constitutional duty to protect
detainees from harmful conditions of confinement in Bell v. Wolfish.125 This
should include the protection of detainees from dangerous cellmates.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer, which interpreted the Eighth
Amendment to impose a criminal recklessness standard, involved a convicted
inmate who claimed that guards failed to protect him from other inmates.126
In this context, where the affirmative act was committed by a fellow inmate,
not a guard, the Supreme Court mandated evidence that officials were aware
of facts from which an inference of a substantial risk could be drawn and that
they actually drew this inference and acted with subjective deliberate indifference.127 For detainees, the breach of the constitutional duty to protect from
harm should not trigger this “subjective” criminal recklessness standard.
Nonetheless, prior to Kingsley most appellate courts required detainees to
meet Eighth Amendment standards,128 and some courts have continued to
do so.129
124 Rosalie Berger Levinson, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo: Revitalizing Youngberg’s Protection of Liberty for the Civilly Committed, 54 B.C. L. REV. 535, 553 (2013) (challenging this false
dichotomy); see also Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Government Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 109 n.9 (1991) (noting that
“the distinction between acts and omissions often turns on how one poses the question”).
125 441 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979).
126 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
127 See id. at 836.
128 See Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117–18 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that Farmer’s
subjective knowledge measure of deliberate indifference is used to evaluate Fourteenth
Amendment claims by pretrial detainees against jail officials, including failure-to-protect
claims, and thus, plaintiff must prove officials personally knew of the constitutional risks
posed by their failure to take sufficient remedial action to protect him from other prisoners); Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331–34 (11th Cir. 2013) (asserting that
although substantive due process, not the Eighth Amendment, technically governs claims
brought by a pretrial detainee, the standard is identical; thus, a detainee assaulted by
others must produce sufficient evidence that jail officials had subjective knowledge of a risk
of serious harm, that they disregarded that risk, and that their conduct rose to the level of
deliberate indifference); Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041, 1046–48 (8th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that jail custodians have a comparable duty to protect pretrial detainees under
the Due Process Clause as they have under the Eighth Amendment, court held that to
prove unconstitutional failure to protect from battery of another inmate, detainee must
show: (1) an objectively serious deprivation (i.e., incarceration under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm), and (2) that defendant was deliberately indifferent to this
substantial risk of harm, which requires a subjective test that defendant was aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed
and that he actually drew the inference); Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639–40 (7th
Cir. 2008) (finding that detainee who alleged that jail officials acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of housing gang members with nongang members failed to show that
the officers acted with the equivalent of criminal recklessness (i.e., that they were actually
aware of a substantial risk of harm to plaintiff’s safety and yet failed to take appropriate
steps to protect him from the specific danger)); Burrell v. Hampshire Cty., 307 F.3d 1, 7–9
(1st Cir. 2002) (although conceding that pretrial detainees are protected under the Due
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The Ninth Circuit recently questioned this view, finding that Kingsley’s
state-of-mind analysis required a different approach to a failure-to-protect
claim.130 Jonathan Castro was a pretrial detainee assigned to a sobering cell
at a police station. Authorities later placed a “combative” inmate arrested on
felony charges in the same cell, contrary to established jail policy, and despite
the availability of empty cells.131 Castro attempted to attract attention by
banging on the cell window, but officials failed to intervene to protect him
from harm, and as a result, he was severely beaten and suffered permanent
injuries.132
The district court, which addressed Castro’s failure-to-protect claim
prior to Kingsley, followed prevailing precedent and held that the Eighth
Amendment requires evidence that the guards had subjective knowledge that
Castro faced a substantial risk of serious harm and yet disregarded that
risk.133 The jury found in Castro’s favor, but the defendants appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to meet the subjective standard.134
On appeal, less than two months after Kingsley, a Ninth Circuit panel
found Kingsley inapplicable, reasoning that, unlike excessive force claims, failure-to-protect claims required proof of a subjective wrongful state of mind
because they do not involve affirmative acts.135 En banc review was granted,
and a split panel held that Kingsley eliminated the need to show subjective
awareness of a risk of harm and that an objective standard should apply.136
The en banc court explained that “[t]he underlying federal right, as well
as the nature of the harm suffered, is the same for pretrial detainees’ excessive force and failure-to-protect claims,” because both categories arise under
the Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.137 It asserted that the Supreme Court in KingsProcess Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment, the court concluded that the standard
is the same, namely a pretrial detainee, who was seriously assaulted by a fellow detainee,
had to demonstrate that he was incarcerated under conditions imposing a substantial risk
of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent in that they were
subjectively aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk could be drawn and
they actually drew such an inference).
129 See Richko v. Wayne Cty., 819 F.3d 907, 915–20 (6th Cir. 2016) (asserting that
Eighth Amendment standards apply to detainees claiming inmate-on-inmate violence;
thus, detainee must prove that official subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a
substantial risk and actually drew the inference, yet disregarded the risk; although plaintiff
need not show that defendant acted with the very purpose of causing harm, there must be
evidence that he “refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or
declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist” (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 843 n.8)).
130 See Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
131 Id. at 1065.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1068.
134 Id. at 1072.
135 See Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 665 (9th Cir. 2015).
136 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1069–70.
137 Id.
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ley did not limit its holding to excessive force claims, but spoke broadly about
the rights of detainees.138 Thus, detainees should not have to prove the
defendant’s subjective intent to punish, even in cases involving failure to take
action to protect.139 The harm in both situations is the same. Whether
excessive force is applied directly by a jailer or by a fellow inmate is irrelevant
because jailers have the same duty to protect pretrial detainees from violence
at the hands of other inmates.140 The court conceded that the state-of-mind
question may be more complex because in excessive force cases it is easier to
determine that the officer’s physical conduct was intentional.141 Nonetheless, it reasoned that the officials who housed Castro with a combative
inmate, despite a clear risk of harm, made an intentional decision.142 Castro
did not have to prove the officials’ subjective actual awareness of the level of
risk their decision would cause.143 Pretrial detainees must prove “more than
negligence but less than [criminal] subjective intent.”144 The court adopted
a four-prong test to clarify the requisite level of culpability that should govern
“failure to” claims:
(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined;
(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm;
(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that
risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have
appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of
the defendant’s conduct obvious; and
(4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s
injuries.145

As to the third element, the Ninth Circuit cited the Restatement of Torts for
the proposition that “ ‘reckless disregard’ may be shown by an objective standard under which an individual ‘is held to the realization of the aggravated
risk which a reasonable [person] in his place would have, although he does
not himself have it.’ ”146 The Restatement’s distinction is critical. The
Supreme Court in Farmer acknowledged that even a convicted inmate who
alleges a failure to protect is not required to show that guards acted with the
138 See id. at 1070.
139 See id. at 1069–70.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 1070.
142 Id. at 1072–73.
143 See id. at 1072.
144 Id. at 1071.
145 Id. With respect to the first factor, note that the Court in Kingsley left open the
possibility that something less than intent (i.e., “‘a reckless state of mind’ with respect to
the defendant’s actions (or inaction)”) could suffice. Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 801
(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015)).
146 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 500 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2016)).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL108.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 25

9-NOV-17

breathing new life into substantive due process

13:47

381

“very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”147
Intent may sometimes be inferred.148 Ultimately, however, the Supreme
Court in Farmer rejected the civil law recklessness standard in favor of a criminal recklessness state of mind.149 In sharp contrast, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that detainees, like Castro, need only present evidence “that a reasonable
officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved.”150
In cases involving breach of the constitutional duty to protect, once it is
established that a jail official made a deliberate decision to expose a detainee
to a substantial risk of serious harm, an objective state-of-mind standard
should govern. The core message of Kingsley is that pretrial detainees should
not be subject to the same rigorous culpability standards as convicted
inmates.
C.

Denial of Prompt, Appropriate Medical Treatment

Another common type of failure-to-act case involves pretrial detainees who
claim that government officials failed to provide them prompt, appropriate
medical treatment. Bell held that detainees cannot be punished, and, thus,
rigorous Eighth Amendment standards should not apply in assessing their
conditions of confinement.151 Nonetheless, most courts, while acknowledging Bell, have applied Eighth Amendment standards to detainees, requiring
them to prove that officials actually knew that the detainee faced a substantial
risk of serious harm if medical treatment was not provided and yet acted with
subjective deliberate indifference to that risk.152 Thus, even in cases where
147 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
148 See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
149 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8 (explaining that, at a minimum, an inmate must
prove that the correctional officer himself “refused to verify underlying facts that he
strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly
suspected to exist”); see also Heather M. Kinney, The “Deliberate Indifference” Test Defined:
Mere Lip Service to the Protection of Prisoners’ Civil Rights, 5 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 121
(1995) (explaining the differences between civil recklessness and criminal recklessness).
150 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1072; see also Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 32–38 (2d Cir. 2017)
(joining the Ninth Circuit in holding that Kingsley mandates overturning precedent, which
required pretrial detainees to meet the same Eighth Amendment standards as convicted
prisoners with regard to a challenge to conditions of confinement; deliberate indifference
must be defined objectively for a due process claim, and thus it sufficed that pretrial
detainee proved defendant official “acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or
recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to
the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that
the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety”; pretrial detainees are no longer
required to establish subjective intent to punish or to expose detainees to a substantial risk
of harm because, unlike the Eighth Amendment, officials can violate due process “without
meting out any punishment,” and thus detainee need not prove official’s subjective awareness that his acts or omissions posed a substantial risk of harm).
151 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
152 See, e.g., Craig v. Floyd Cty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
although pretrial detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause, rather than the
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prison officials make a deliberate decision to deny medical treatment despite
objective facts that should have made them aware that a detainee was in
immediate danger of serious harm, they are insulated from liability in the
absence of evidence that they were actually aware of the danger in a subjective sense and subjectively recognized that their actions were inappropriate in
light of that risk.153
In 1976, the Supreme Court held that convicted prisoners have an
Eighth Amendment right to medical care and that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs” is the governing standard of liability.154 Farmer later
explained, however, that deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment requires proof of subjective criminal recklessness.155 The Court had
the opportunity in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital156 to clarify
the appropriate standard for assessing substantive due process claims of inadequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees. Instead, the Court simply
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment afforded protections “at least as
great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,” without clarifying the substantive due process culpability standard.157
In Lewis, the Court invoked City of Revere in explaining that deliberate indifference to the medical needs of pretrial detainees is “egregious enough” to
satisfy the “conscience-shocking” element required of substantive due process
claims, but again the objective versus subjective state-of-mind question was
not addressed.158
Some appellate courts have acknowledged language in Farmer suggesting
that the Eighth Amendment’s subjective mental state may sometimes be
inferred from objective facts demonstrating that the “medical need was ‘obviEighth Amendment, medical treatment claims are subject to the same scrutiny); Caiozzo v.
Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 70–72 (2d Cir. 2009) (adopting the position of the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, that the Farmer test, which
demands evidence that a defendant was actually subjectively aware of a risk of danger,
applies equally to pretrial detainees who claim they are denied adequate medical care),
overruled on other grounds by Darnell, 849 F.3d 17; Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d
294, 302–09 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that although deliberate indifference is the standard
that governs officials’ alleged failure to attend to a detainee’s serious medical needs, this
requires a showing that officials subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm and subjectively recognized that actions were inappropriate in light of that risk).
153 See Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2008) (cautioning that
substantive due process liability is not triggered by an official’s failure to alleviate a significant medical risk that should have been perceived because imputed or collective knowledge does not satisfy the need to show deliberate indifference; plaintiff must demonstrate
both an awareness of facts from which an inference of serious risk could be drawn and that
the official actually drew the inference).
154 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
155 See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
156 463 U.S. 239 (1983).
157 Id. at 244.
158 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849–50 (1998) (citing City of Revere, 463
U.S. at 244).
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ous’ and that the officer’s response was ‘obviously inadequate.’ ”159 However,
the Court in Farmer cautioned that obviousness does not necessarily prove
“subjective knowledge,” and that a prison guard must be given the opportunity to show that “the obvious escaped him.”160 Farmer clearly held that a
subjective mens rea of criminal recklessness governs; in fact, the Court specifically rejected the civil law recklessness standard.161 It stressed that lower
courts must be clear in instructing jurors that proof of subjective intent is
required under the Eighth Amendment and that the question of what a reasonable man would or should have known is irrelevant.162
The Sixth Circuit, both before and after Kingsley, has rejected the use of
the Eighth Amendment’s heightened malice standard in favor of a “traditional” deliberate indifference test where there was clearly time for officials
to deliberate regarding a detainee’s serious medical need.163 As previously
discussed, the “objective” reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment
already incorporates this temporal factor as highly relevant in assessing culpa159 Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Thompson v. King, 730
F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2013)); see id. at 964–65 (applying Eighth Amendment subjective
deliberate indifference standard to claim brought by the estate of a pretrial detainee who
died of heart condition following arrest on intoxication-related charges, but finding that
the facts alleged were sufficient to create an inference that the state trooper was deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s need for medical attention because the detainee showed
obvious signs that he needed prompt medical attention, and subjective criminal recklessness may be inferred from facts that demonstrate that a medical need was obvious and that
an officer’s response was “obviously inadequate”); Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604
F.3d 293, 301–02 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying the same legal standard to a pretrial detainee’s
claim alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs as developed under the Eighth
Amendment, but recognizing that circumstantial evidence can be used to establish subjective awareness and subjective deliberate indifference); Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531,
540 (6th Cir. 2008) (asserting that a detainee need not show that an officer acted with the
specific intent to cause harm, and because officials seldom admit the subjective component, courts may infer from circumstantial evidence that a prison official had the requisite
knowledge).
160 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 n.8, 848 (1994); see also Martinez v. Beggs, 563
F.3d 1082, 1089–91 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that pretrial detainees alleging denial of
medical attention must meet the Eighth Amendment standard that requires a plaintiff to
prove that defendants actually knew a detainee faced a substantial risk of harm and that
even an obvious risk cannot conclusively establish an inference that the official subjectively
knew of this risk).
161 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37.
162 Id. at 843 n.8.
163 Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 436, 444–45 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that where a
pretrial detainee alleges denial of access to adequate medical care, the relevant standard
depends on whether officials have time to deliberate regarding that care; because officials
had fifteen minutes to appreciate the need for medical treatment, deliberate indifference
as opposed to a heightened malice standard should have been used in assessing the claim);
Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of pretrial detainees constitutes a substantive due
process violation and rejecting use of heightened malice standard because there was time
to deliberate where officers left arrestee on the ground for a prolonged time, even after
noticing arrestee had stopped breathing).
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bility.164 Where officials make a deliberate decision to deny objectively necessary medical treatment, Kingsley now dictates that no further mens rea
should be necessary to prove a substantive due process violation.165 Nonetheless, most appellate courts have continued to impose the Eighth Amendment’s criminal subjective mens rea standard, even after Kingsley.166
164 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
165 Of course, detainees must still satisfy the requirement of an objectively serious medical need, and often detainees’ claims are lost on this basis. See, e.g., Mead v. Palmer, 794
F.3d 932, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
standard and holding that civilly committed sex offender failed to prove he suffered an
objectively serious medical need based on denial of his request for dentures, where he was
never prescribed dentures as a medical necessity).
166 See Dang ex rel. Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2, 1279–82
(11th Cir. 2017) (reasoning that Kingsley involved excessive force and does not extend to
claims of inadequate medical treatment of pretrial detainees, which continue to be governed by the same standard as a prisoner’s claim under the Eighth Amendment, where
plaintiff who claimed inadequate medical care from doctors and nurses for his treatment
of meningitis, which caused multiple strokes and permanent injuries, could not satisfy the
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard, which requires evidence of an objectively serious medical need, subjective knowledge of the risk of serious harm, and disregard
of that risk); id. at 1280 (“[I]mputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a
due process claim of deliberate indifference” to a pretrial detainee’s serious medical need.
(alteration in original) (quoting Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir.
2008))); Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying Eighth
Amendment standards to class action, which included pretrial detainees who claimed inadequate medical care, despite Kingsley’s recognition of a more protective standard for
detainees than for convicted inmates who allege excessive force); Mason v. Lafayette CityPar. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 279 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that detainee must show
that official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious medical harm and
then acted with deliberate indifference, which suggests “wanton disregard for any serious
medical needs” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776,
785–86 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that a two-day delay in providing pain medication to pretrial detainee failed to show the culpable state of mind necessary to satisfy Eighth Amendment standard that infliction must be deliberate or reckless in a criminal-law sense);
Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 618–20 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that there was no evidence that deputies were both aware of facts from which it could be inferred that detainee
faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that deputies in fact drew this inference, as
necessary to support a claim that detainee was denied substantive due process); see also Rife
v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 647–49 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that pretrial detainees must satisfy the same standard required under the Eighth Amendment for
claims alleging inadequate medical care, but ruling that detainee presented sufficient evidence of a conscious disregard of a substantial health risk, which would meet the subjective
prong of Farmer, because the plaintiff presented evidence of an obvious risk to his health
or safety that could indicate official’s subjective knowledge and conscious disregard of that
risk); Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 731–34 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding, without resolving whether Kingsley’s less demanding objective unreasonable standard governs due process claims of inadequate medical care, that district court properly dismissed pretrial
detainee’s claim because detainee failed to meet even the less demanding “objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances” standard); Dixon v. Cty. of Cook, 819 F.3d 343,
349–50 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that pretrial detainee, who claimed denial of adequate
medical treatment, plausibly alleged enough to survive a motion to dismiss, even under
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Further, where professional prison doctors or nurses, as opposed to
guards, make the decision to deny adequate medical care, pretrial detainees
should be treated the same as those who have been involuntarily institutionalized. The Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo held that medical decisions
that constitute a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment” violate the guarantee of substantive due process.167 While a few courts
have held that deliberate indifference may be inferred where medical professionals act contrary to accepted medical standards,168 other courts have
refused to apply Youngberg and have instead imposed the Eighth Amendment’s subjective deliberate indifference standard.169
Eighth Amendment standards, by showing the official knew detainee had a chest tumor
and offered him only nonprescription pain medication, that she ordered psychiatric consult to determine whether detainee was malingering, and that she ordered his wheelchair
removed upon his return to the regular jail); Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589, 593–94 (8th
Cir. 2016) (holding that, although Kingsley adopted an objective reasonableness standard
for arrestees claiming excessive force, the law regarding denial of medical care is not clear,
and thus, to survive qualified immunity, pretrial detainee must prove deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment standard, and plaintiff failed to produce sufficient
evidence to show that defendant had actual knowledge of an objectively serious medical
need and yet deliberately disregarded it).
167 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314 (1982); supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV (discussing this case).
168 See King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that
whereas nonmedical officers may not be found deliberately indifferent unless they have
knowledge that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating or not treating a prisoner,
deliberate indifference on the part of medical staff may be inferred when the medical
professional’s decision is “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment . . . as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a
judgment” (quoting Estate of Cole ex rel. Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 261–62 (7th Cir.
1996))); cf. Holloway v. Del. Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1072–73 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding
that jail physician’s decision to prescribe nonnarcotic medications for pain, rather than the
OxyContin that his treating physician had prescribed, was not “a substantial departure
from accepted professional standards,” even if the doctor asserted he did not believe in
prescribing OxyContin for pain management, because there was no evidence that this
belief was based on personal rather than medical reasons).
169 Dang ex rel. Dang, 871 F.3d at 1279–82 (applying Eighth Amendment standards that
govern nonmedical defendants and, without citing Youngberg, rejecting pretrial detainee’s
claim that doctors and nurses violated his substantive due process rights by failing to recognize his symptoms of meningitis); Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060, 1065–66 (8th Cir.
2014) (asserting that pretrial detainee who alleged a violation of his right to medical care
must meet Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard, and merely demonstrating that prison doctor committed medical malpractice did not meet this standard absent
evidence that the doctor’s actions were so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care); Ramos v. Patnaude, 640 F.3d 485, 489–90
(1st Cir. 2011) (holding that Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard applied
to due process claims challenging doctor’s treatment decisions and concluding that jury
could not possibly find that doctor “actually understood that such a substantial risk existed
and was actually indifferent to it in failing to take appropriate mitigating action”; although
a jury could conclude, as an expert testified, that the doctor could have provided more
prompt medical care and that the level of treatment was inadequate under professional
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D. Suicide Prevention
As with claims of failure to provide safe conditions of confinement or adequate medical treatment, in suicide cases most appellate courts have required
that plaintiffs meet the Eighth Amendment’s subjective deliberate indifference test, thereby requiring evidence that officials actually knew that a
detainee was a serious suicide risk and yet acted with criminal deliberate
indifference to that risk.170 Some courts continue to apply this standard
after Kingsley.171
Where medical professionals make treatment decisions regarding suicidal detainees, Youngberg’s objective standard should govern—decisions that
constitute “a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment” violate substantive due process.172 As to jail guards and officials, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Castro provides an appropriate analysis, namely, plaintiffs
norms, this does not equate with deliberate indifference and is inconsistent with the
required finding of subjective deliberate indifference to a substantial risk); Clouthier v.
Cty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241–49 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to apply Youngberg’s
holding that mentally ill detainees have a constitutional right to mental health care that
does not substantially depart from accepted professional judgment, and thus, plaintiff
could not avoid the burden of showing that individual defendants subjectively acted with
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm), overruled in part by Castro v.
Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
170 See Luckert v. Dodge Cty., 684 F.3d 808, 817–19 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that
although detainees have a constitutional right to be protected from the known risks of
suicide, plaintiff failed to show that the deceased’s jailers acted with deliberate indifference
in the sense of criminal recklessness); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650,
678–81 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that jail personnel could not be held liable for the death
of a pretrial detainee because there was no evidence that guards were subjectively aware of
the possibility that the detainee might engage in compulsive water drinking behavior that
would cause him to die); Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 820–22 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that pretrial detainees are subject to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard, which requires evidence that defendants subjectively knew the detainee was at substantial risk of committing suicide and yet intentionally disregarded that risk); Clouthier,
591 F.3d at 1242 (holding that parents who claimed that officials failed to prevent their
son’s suicide had to meet Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference test); Brumfield v.
Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a plaintiff must prove officials
acted with subjective deliberate indifference to the rights of the deceased who committed
suicide); Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s
claim due to lack of evidence that defendant actually knew detainee was at risk of committing suicide, as required under the Eighth Amendment).
171 See, e.g., Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177–80 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying Eighth
Amendment standards and holding that, although plaintiff presented sufficient evidence
to infer that jail official actually knew of a substantial risk that pretrial detainee was a suicide risk, she failed to meet Farmer’s deliberate indifference test, even if the official’s
response to suicide risk was “imperfect”); Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1354–56 (11th
Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court erred in not granting summary judgment to
correction officers who allegedly failed to prevent detainee’s suicide where, even if officers
were aware that detainee had made explicit suicide threats in the past, none had subjective
knowledge of a significant risk that pretrial detainee would attempt suicide).
172 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314; see supra notes 14–17, 167–69 and accompanying text.
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should prevail where a prison official (1) makes an intentional decision with
regard to conditions of confinement that (2) puts a suicidal detainee at substantial risk of harm, and (3) fails to take preventive measures that are reasonable and available even though a reasonable official would have
appreciated the high degree of risk involved, and (4) this failure caused the
detainee’s injury.173 This approach recognizes Kingsley’s core message that
detainees are entitled to greater protection than convicted inmates, and thus,
proof of criminal mens rea should no longer be required in assessing
liability.
IV. KINGSLEY’S IMPACT ON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS BROUGHT
THE CIVILLY COMMITTED AND STUDENTS

BY

In 1982, the Supreme Court recognized that those who are involuntarily
committed to a state institution enjoy a constitutionally protected liberty
interest which guarantees the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable restraint, and minimally adequate training sufficient to ensure those liberty interests.174 In a unanimous decision,
the Court held that when medically trained government officials make decisions that constitute a substantial departure from professional judgment,
they violate the substantive due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.175 The Court specifically rejected the state’s argument
that the rigorous Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate indifference or
criminal recklessness standard should govern the due process rights of those
who are civilly committed to state institutions.176
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition that those who are civilly committed in state institutions do not lose their core liberty interests and that
they enjoy greater protection than convicted criminals, appellate courts have
seriously eroded the substantive due process protection recognized in
Youngberg.177 Many of these courts have relied on language in Lewis that
“only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the
constitutional sense.’ ”178 Although the Supreme Court in Lewis did not overturn Youngberg, and in fact cited it as valid authority,179 some federal courts
have ruled that the shocks-the-conscience test superseded the Youngberg standard.180 Further, most of these courts have held that this “new” test requires
173 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
174 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315–19.
175 Id. at 324.
176 Id. at 325 (“[W]e conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment.”).
177 See Levinson, supra note 124 (tracing and critiquing this demise).
178 Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
179 Id. at 852 n.12.
180 See Montin v. Gibson, 718 F.3d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that even if an
involuntarily committed mental patient who was denied unsupervised access to unsecured
grounds was subjected to a bodily restraint within the meaning of substantive due process,
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that the civilly committed satisfy the rigorous Eighth Amendment standard,
which Youngberg specifically rejected.181 Other courts acknowledge that
Youngberg’s “professional judgment standard . . . is at least as demanding as
the Eighth Amendment ‘deliberate indifference’ standard,” but they have
then rejected the notion that the Youngberg standard is more demanding.182
These courts have misconstrued Lewis as having displaced or weakened
Youngberg’s protection of the rights of the civilly committed. Lewis in fact
recognized Youngberg’s holding that, in the context of civil commitment, substantive due process is violated when state medical personnel fail to exercise
professional judgment.183 Further, those courts that have equated the professional judgment standard with the Eighth Amendment’s criminal recklessness standard have ignored Youngberg’s core holding that the rights of the
involuntarily committed are greater than the rights of convicted inmates.184
Those who are in state custody due to mental incapacity arguably enjoy even
officials satisfied the professional judgment standard because a substantive due process
claim may be maintained only if the contested state action is “so egregious or outrageous
that it is conscience-shocking” (quoting Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723, 729 (8th Cir.
2004))); J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 79–81 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that a civilly committed
patient must prove that official misconduct rose to a conscience-shocking level, which
requires “‘stunning’ evidence of ‘arbitrariness and caprice’” (quoting DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 119 (1st Cir. 2005))); Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165,
174–75 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that even if a professional decision falls substantially below
medical standards, it will not be found to violate substantive due process unless it is also
“conscience-shocking”).
181 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[b]oth the
Farmer and Youngberg tests leave ample room for professional judgment, constraints
presented by the institutional setting, and the need to give latitude to administrators who
have to make difficult trade-offs as to risks and resources”); Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886,
894–95 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the professional judgment standard is the same as
Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference standard); Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x
860, 863 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[R]elevant case law in the Eighth Amendment
context also serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed.” (quoting Dolihite v. Maughon ex rel. Videon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996)));
Moore ex rel. Moore v. Briggs, 381 F.3d 771, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the
Lewis Court “equated deliberate indifference for substantive due process and Eighth
Amendment purposes,” and thus, an intellectually disabled state home resident had to
meet a criminal recklessness standard to recover on his substantive due process claim).
182 See, e.g., Collignon v. Milwaukee Cty., 163 F.3d 982, 988–89 (7th Cir. 1998) (conceding that the Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate indifference standard assesses
whether conduct amounts to unlawful punishment for convicted persons, while reasoning
that “there is minimal difference in what the two standards require of state actors,” because
“[o]nly the criminal recklessness standard provides adequate notice of what conduct is or
is not permitted”).
183 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12.
184 See Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1063 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Bolmer
v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 142–45 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a substantive due process
violation will be found where the decision is made based on substantive or procedural
criteria that are substantially below the standards generally accepted in the medical community). In Bolmer, the court held that the district court did not err in applying this test
despite Lewis, because a physician’s decision that departs from accepted standards meets
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greater rights to adequate care and treatment than pretrial detainees who are
taken into custody because the state has reasonable cause to believe they have
committed a crime.185 Further, although pretrial detainees are housed in
jails or prisons that law enforcement officials supervise, those in state institutions are often housed in hospitals staffed by medical professionals. Because
those committed to state institutions for mental incapacity often face lengthy
and even lifelong confinement, the Court in Youngberg protected their rights
by requiring that professional decisions exhibit professional concern and
judgment.186
Further, as to nonmedical personnel, Bell’s holding, now reinvigorated
by Kingsley, mandates that the deliberate misconduct of those assigned to
care for the civilly committed be assessed under an objective reasonableness
standard.187 Kingsley confirmed that using an Eighth Amendment criminal
recklessness standard for those who have not been convicted of a crime provides insufficient protection from abuse of power.188 Some courts have
acknowledged that where the claim involves excessive force, the substantive
due process analysis is the same for pretrial detainees and the civilly committed, and thus Kingsley’s objective standard governs.189 Further, as explained
in Part III, Kingsley should not be restricted to excessive force claims, but,
rather, should be interpreted as a general rejection of the Eighth Amendment’s criminal recklessness mens rea for all claims brought by detainees as
well as the civilly committed.
the shocks-the-conscience test, and post-Lewis caselaw does not indicate that the professional medical standards test has been overruled. Id.
185 See Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 99–100 (1st Cir. 2001) (reasoning that the district
court did not err in failing to give a shocks the conscience jury instruction in a case challenging whether mental health personnel violated substantive due process by failing to
intervene to protect an involuntarily committed mental health patient who was being
beaten by another mental health worker). The plaintiff in Davis was being held in state
custody not due to culpable conduct, but because of mental illness, and mental health
workers are held to a more exacting standard than police officers chasing a fleeing car;
therefore, the court determined that the proper question is whether the force used was
“objectively reasonable” under all the circumstances. See id.
186 For a full discussion of the rights of the civilly committed, challenging courts that
have viewed Lewis as altering Youngberg, and criticizing the use of Eighth Amendment standards, see Levinson, supra note 124, at 566–69.
187 See supra notes 81–82.
188 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015).
189 See Carter v. Huterson, 831 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that an objective standard governed a civilly committed plaintiff’s claim that defendant officials “physically assaulted and attacked him”); Clay v. Emmi, 797 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2015)
(explaining that after Kingsley, a plaintiff’s claim that officers used excessive force while
restraining him during a mental health commitment “is subject to the same objective standard as an excessive force claim brought under the Fourth Amendment”); Perez v. Wicker,
No. 2:14-cv-558, 2016 WL 3543502, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 29, 2016) (holding that Kingsley’s
objective standard applies equally to civilly committed detainees); Madison v. Scott, No. 133317, 2015 WL 5734874, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2015) (applying Kingsley’s objective standard to excessive force claims by civilly committed detainee, but finding officials acted
reasonably in light of plaintiff’s noncompliance with their orders).
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Similarly, public school students who bring substantive due process
claims alleging a deprivation of liberty, usually in the form of corporal punishment, sexual abuse, or verbal or physical harassment, are required by
many appellate courts to meet the same draconian Eighth Amendment standards as detainees and the civilly committed. The Supreme Court held that
public school students have a liberty interest in being free from “appreciable
physical pain” in Ingraham v. Wright.190 However, many courts have imposed
an extremely high burden on students to establish that their teacher’s misconduct truly shocks the conscience.191 For example, in Domingo v. Kowalski,192 parents challenged a special education teacher’s disciplinary methods,
which included gagging and strapping an autistic student to a gurney
because he was spitting at others and using a belt to strap another student to
a toilet because she was not toilet trained and had balance problems.193 The
court recognized that this conduct “may have been inappropriate, insensitive, and even tortious,” but it held nonetheless that it was not so egregious as
to rise to the level of a substantive due process violation because the parents
failed to prove that the conduct was either “clearly extreme and disproportionate to the need presented to be excessive in the constitutional sense,” or
“so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the conscience.”194
Borrowing Eighth Amendment language, many appellate courts have
required students to prove that their teachers acted with intentional malice
or sadism in order to recover.195 Many of these cases involve teachers who
190 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
191 See Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 868–69,
(5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“‘The burden to show state conduct that shocks the conscience
is extremely high, requiring stunning evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends
beyond mere violations of state law, even violations resulting from bad faith to something
more egregious and more extreme.’” (quoting J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent.
Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (asserting that, although striking
a student without any pedagogical or disciplinary justification is undeniably wrong, not all
wrongs perpetrated by a government actor violate due process—rather, only action that
can fairly be viewed as brutal and offensive to human dignity shocks the conscience); Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 725–26 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
teacher’s conduct in rubbing a student’s stomach, accompanied by remark that could reasonably be interpreted as sexually suggestive, although wholly inappropriate, was not sufficient to state a violation of substantive due process rights because it was not brutal and
inhumane).
192 810 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2016).
193 Id. at 407.
194 Id. at 410–16 (quoting Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
195 See, e.g., Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Schs., 715 F.3d 775, 786–87 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding that to sustain claim involving corporal punishment, plaintiff must show that the
conduct “was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or
sadism . . . [as to amount] to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience” (quoting Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir.
1987))); T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 598–603 (11th Cir.
2010) (reasoning that to claim excessive corporal punishment there must be evidence that
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act with objective deliberate indifference to students’ rights, and yet claims
are rejected and no liability is imposed because the students cannot meet the
“inspired by malice or sadism” standard that governs claims brought by adults
convicted of a crime. The Supreme Court’s rejection in Kingsley of Eighth
Amendment standards for pretrial detainees surely should apply to students
who are subjected to physical abuse by school officials, even if such abuse is
not “inspired by malice or sadism.”
CONCLUSION
Substantive due process should be recognized as a meaningful limitation
on the arbitrary abuse of executive power by jail and prison officials, medical
professionals and nonmedical staff who work in state mental institutions, and
public school officials. Courts that have imposed a draconian shocks-the-conscience standard by misconstruing Lewis, as well as courts that have imposed
the Eighth Amendment’s criminal recklessness standard on those never convicted of a crime, have now been alerted by the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Kingsley that an objective civil culpability standard should govern claims of
the punishment was “obviously excessive” as an objective matter and that the teacher subjectively intended to use that obviously excessive amount of force in circumstances where it
was foreseeable that serious bodily injury could result; teacher’s use of corporal punishment against student with pervasive developmental disorder, which included pinning the
student’s arms behind his back while she led him to the cool down room, was not arbitrary,
egregious, and conscience-shocking because, although the force aggravated the student’s
developmental disability, exacerbated his behavioral problems, and caused symptoms of
post traumatic stress disorder, it was not so severe that it amounted to torture); C.N. v.
Willmar Pub. Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 634–35 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a student must establish both a fundamental right and that the teacher’s conduct
shocks the contemporary conscience, which mandates evidence that the conduct was “so
inspired by malice or sadism . . . that it amounted to brutal and inhumane abuse of official
power literally shocking to the conscience” (quoting Golden ex rel. Balch v. Anders, 324
F.3d 650, 652–53 (8th Cir. 2003))); Nolan v. Memphis City Schs., 589 F.3d 257, 269–70
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a coach’s use of corporal punishment against basketball
player, who was subjected to paddling two to three times a week over the course of three
years, causing both physical pain and psychological injury, was not conscience-shocking
because plaintiffs failed to prove “the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism . . . that it
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience” (quoting Webb, 828 F.2d at 1158) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davis v.
Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 980–81, 984 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a coach’s conduct in
depriving student of water after he exhibited signs of overheating and not summoning
immediate medical care after he collapsed on the football field did not state a cause of
action under substantive due process because the complaint could not support a finding
that the coach acted willfully or maliciously with an intent to injure the student; deliberate
indifference, without more, does not rise to the conscience-shocking level required for a
constitutional violation); cf. Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1029–33
(7th Cir. 2012) (acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit has not determined whether
deliberate indifference implies the criminal standard of recklessness, which requires actual
knowledge of a risk, or the civil standard of obviousness, and conceding that there is “at
least a shade of difference” between the two standards).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL108.txt

392

unknown

Seq: 36

notre dame law review

9-NOV-17

13:47

[vol. 93:1

constitutional wrongdoing. Kingsley’s interpretation of substantive due process as a meaningful restraint against the arbitrary misuse of executive power
gives hope to all victims of abuse of power.

